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Abstract: This paper examines empirically the impacts of sharing rules of origin (RoOs) with other 
ASEAN+1 free trade agreements (FTAs) on ASEAN-Korea FTA/ASEAN-China FTA utilization in 
Thai exports in 2011. Our careful empirical analysis suggests that the harmonization of RoOs across 
FTAs play some role in reducing the costs yielded through the spaghetti bowl phenomenon. In 
particular, the harmonization to “change-in-tariff classification (CTC) or real value-added content 
(RVC)” will play a relatively positive role in not seriously discouraging firms’ use of multiple FTA 
schemes. On the other hand, the harmonization to CTC or CTC&RVC hinders firms from using 
those schemes. 
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1. Introduction 
     Against the background of the explosive increase of free trade agreements (FTAs), 
there is a rising concern regarding the so-called “spaghetti bowl phenomenon”. 
Although several definitions of this phenomenon have been proposed, its essence is the 
rise of costs for the use of FTA schemes under a larger number of FTA schemes.1 Such 
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 For a more precise concept of the spaghetti bowl phenomenon, see Bhagwati (1995) and Bhagwati 
et al. (1998). 
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a concern emerges also in East Asia. In particular, ASEAN countries have multilateral 
FTAs with six countries including Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and New 
Zealand. These ASEAN+1 FTAs are the Australia-New Zealand-ASEAN FTA 
(AANZFTA), ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA), ASEAN-India FTA (AIFTA), 
ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP), and ASEAN-Korea 
FTA (AKFTA). AANZFTA, ACFTA, AIFTA, AJCEP, and AKFTA entered into force in 
2010, 2004, 2010, 2008, and 2007, respectively. There are also many bilateral FTAs by 
ASEAN countries. This situation is called a “noodle bowl” in Baldwin (2008), i.e., a 
situation more complicated than a “spaghetti bowl”. 
     The crucial sources for the rise in costs for FTA use through such a phenomenon 
are various kinds of differences across FTAs. Those include differences in FTA 
preferential products, FTA preferential rates, rules of origin (RoOs), and necessary 
documents for certificates of origin (CoOs). For example, the share of eligible products 
out of all products is widely different across ASEAN+1 FTAs. Even if a product is 
eligible for all those FTAs, the preferential rates might still be different because the 
years of entry into force are different and most of the preferential products reduce the 
tariff rates gradually, i.e., staging elimination. The general RoOs are “Change in 
Heading (CH) or Real Value-added Content (RVC)” in AANZFTA, AJCEP, and AKFTA, 
“RVC” in ACFTA, and “Change in Subheading and RVC” in AIFTA. In using multiple 
ASEAN+1 FTAs, firms must check these differences, which may result in substantial 
costs for firms. 
     This paper focuses on the differences in RoOs across FTAs. Specifically, our 
question in this paper is whether or not it is possible to avoid a rise in compliance costs 
if RoOs are harmonized across FTAs.
2
 We examine FTA utilization in exporting from 
Thailand to Korea or China in 2011. That is, sample FTA schemes are restricted to 
ACFTA and AKFTA. Then, we examine whether or not the FTA utilization is higher 
when ACFTA/AKFTA shares RoOs with some other ASEAN+1 FTAs including 
AANZFTA, AIFTA, and AJCEP. If such commonality of RoOs raises FTA utilization, 
the harmonization of RoOs across FTA schemes will contribute to reducing the costs for 
simultaneously complying with RoOs in multiple FTA schemes. 
     The potential impacts of RoOs harmonization on FTA utilization are mixed and 
might be different among RoOs. Suppose that a firm in Thailand exports its product to 
China and Korea and that RoOs for this product are “Change in Tariff Classification 
(CTC)” in both ACFTA and AKFTA (here we do not consider more detailed CTC rules 
                                                   
2
 Other (more) effective tools would be the introduction of de minimis rules or extended 
accumulation rules, which are not examined in this paper. 
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such as CH). This firm uses significant inputs from the U.S. Under this example, if the 
firm can comply with CTC in ACFTA, it must be also able to do so in AKFTA because 
compliance with CTC in ACFTA means a substantial transformation of U.S. inputs, 
which also can meet CTC in AKFTA. In other words, compliance with CTC in two FTA 
schemes is possible. However, if compliance in ACFTA becomes possible by using 
significant inputs from China, it may be difficult to comply with CTC in AKFTA 
because inputs from China are non-originating inputs for AKFTA. A similar story 
applies to the case of RVC. Compliance with RVC in ACFTA implies that a significant 
portion of inputs comes from member countries including China and Thailand. In the 
case of using a significant portion of inputs from members other than China (i.e., inputs 
from ASEAN countries), compliance with RVC in AKFTA is possible because inputs 
from ASEAN countries are also originating inputs for AKFTA. However, in the case of 
using a significant portion of inputs from China, it is difficult to comply with RVC in 
AKFTA because inputs from China are non-originating inputs for AKFTA. 
     “CTC or RVC” is one of the candidates of RoOs that enables relatively easy 
simultaneous compliance in multiple FTA schemes. Suppose that both ACFTA and 
AKFTA adopt “CTC or RVC” for the product in the above example. If a significant 
portion of inputs come from China, the firm will be able to comply particularly with 
“RVC” in ACFTA. Even in this case, if such inputs from China are substantially 
transformed, the firm can comply with “CTC” in AKFTA. Namely, the harmonization of 
RoOs to “CTC or RVC” may enable firms to comply easily with RoOs in those FTAs, at 
least compared with “CTC” and “RVC”. However, it is obvious that, even in this case, if 
the inputs from China are not substantially transformed, the firm cannot comply with 
“CTC or RVC” in AKFTA. In sum, the impacts of RoOs harmonization will differ by 
firm (i.e., firm’s procurement patterns) and RoOs (e.g., CTC or RVC). In this paper, we 
evaluate the average impacts according to RoOs. 
     This paper is related to some existing studies. First, it is close to Hayakawa 
(2013) in terms of empirically studying the spaghetti bowl phenomenon. In using 
multiple FTA schemes, firms will need to use more local inputs because local inputs can 
meet RoOs in any FTA. Based on this hypothesis, Hayakawa (2013) found for Japanese 
affiliates in ASEAN that users of more than two FTA schemes have around 6% higher 
local input share. Furthermore, users of more than six FTA schemes have around 
20%-30% higher local input share. As a result, he concludes that some amount of 
benefits from such FTA use is offset by the change in procurement sources because the 
original pattern of procurement should be optimal. In sum, Hayakawa (2013) shows the 
existence of “costs” for the spaghetti bowl phenomenon. On the other hand, our paper 
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shows how we could avoid or minimize such costs. 
Second, this paper also belongs to the literature analyzing the determinants on 
FTA utilization. Bureau et al. (2007) examine utilization of the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) granted by the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) to 
developing countries in the agri-goods sector, while Cadot et al. (2006) focus on the 
trade of the EU and the US with their preferential trading partners. Francois et al. (2006) 
and Manchin (2006) examine the preferential trade relations of the EU and 
non-least-developed African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries under the Cotonou 
Agreement, while Hakobyan (2010) examines US GSP utilization by 143 GSP-eligible 
countries. Keck and Lendle (2012) analyze utilization of both unilateral and bilateral 
preferences by not only the EU and US but also Australia and Canada. These studies 
consistently found that FTA utilization is higher in the products with the larger tariff 
margin and the less restrictive RoOs. In addition to these elements, we examine the role 
of RoOs commonality on FTA utilization. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents basic 
information on ASEAN+1 FTAs. After specifying our empirical framework to examine 
the impacts of common RoOs on FTA utilization in Section 3, we report our estimation 
results in Section 4. Last, Section 5 concludes this paper. 
 
 
2. Basic Information on ASEAN+1 FTAs 
     This section takes a brief overview of ASEAN+1 FTAs. Table 1 reports RoOs at 
the harmonized system (HS) six-digit level by ASEAN+1 FTAs in 2011. These RoOs 
are the ones applied in exporting from Thailand to each plus-one partner. The 
information on RoOs is drawn from the legal texts of each ASEAN+1 FTA. The RoOs 
in the case of AANZFTA are the ones for exporting to Australia. All ASEAN+1 FTAs 
except for AIFTA set product-specific RoOs in addition to the above-mentioned general 
RoOs. RoOs are set at the HS six-digit level. There are some types of RoOs including 
change-in-chapter (CC), CH, CS, RVC, technical requirement/specific process (TECH), 
and wholly-obtained rule (WO). CC, CH, and CS are collectively called CTC. “FREE” 
indicates that all products in an HS six-digit code have zero most favoured nation 
(MFN) rates. “NO” indicates that all products in an HS six-digit code are ineligible for 
FTA schemes, i.e., are not preferential products. Some RoOs are combinations of simple 
RoOs including CTC/RVC, CTC&RVC, and so on. 
 
===   Table 1   === 
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     In Table 1, there are five noteworthy points. First, firms in Thailand can enjoy 
zero MFN rates in exporting half of all products to Australia and Japan. Second, India 
and Korea designate a relatively large number of products as ineligible products. This is 
because the tariff reduction for most of the products starts from 2014 in the case of 
AIFTA and the tariff reduction for the products placed on sensitive- and highly-sensitive 
lists starts from 2012 in the case of AKFTA. Third, in the case of AJCEP, a relatively 
large number can be found not only in its general rule, CH/RVC, but also in CC-related 
RoOs including CC and CC&TECH. Fourth, purely CTC&RVC rules, which are known 
to be very restrictive, are found only in AIFTA (CS&RVC) and AKFTA (CH&RVC). 
Last, AANZFTA and AJCEP set a relatively wide variety of RoOs depending on 
products. While such RoOs might be business-friendly if they are set according to the 
specificity of products, such a variety leads to yielding costs for firms because firms 
need to check RoOs for their products. 
     Next, we take a closer look at differences in RoOs across ASEAN+1 FTAs. In 
particular, we shed light on those of RoOs in ACFTA/AKFTA in comparison with RoOs 
in the others. Table 2 shows RoOs’ matrix showing ACFTA and other ASEAN+1 FTAs. 
For simplicity, we use the rough RoOs like CTC, not strict RoOs such as CC, CH, and 
CS. In the case of AANZFTA, a large number of observations can be seen in the 
combination of RVC in ACFTA and CTC/RVC in AANZFTA. However, most of the 
products eligible for ACFTA have zero MFN rates when exporting to Australia. Since 
AIFTA does not set product specific RoOs, most of the products eligible for ACFTA 
have CTC&RVC in AIFTA. As in the case of AJCEP, most of the products eligible for 
ACFTA have zero MFN rates when exporting to Japan. However, a relatively large 
number of observations can be found in not only the combination of RVC in ACFTA 
and CTC/RVC in AJCEP but also the combination of RVC in ACFTA and CTC in 
AJCEP and that of RVC/TECH in ACFTA and CTC&TECH in AJCEP. In the case of 
AKFTA, most of the products eligible for ACFTA have the combination of RVC in 
ACFTA and CTC/RVC in AKFTA. 
 
===   Table 2   === 
 
     Table 3 reports the RoOs matrix showing AKFTA and other ASEAN+1 FTAs. In 
the case of AANZFTA, a large number of observations can be seen in the combination 
of CTC/RVC in both AANZFTA and AKFTA, in addition to the combination of 
CTC/RVC in AKFTA and FREE in AANZFTA. Again, most of the products eligible for 
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AKFTA have CTC&RVC in AIFTA. In the case of AJCEP, a large number of 
observations can be seen in the combination of CTC/RVC in both AJCEP and AKFTA, 
in addition to the combination of CTC/RVC in AKFTA and FREE in AJCEP. Thus, we 
can say that AKFTA shares RoOs with AANZFTA and AJCEP in many products. 
 
===   Table 3   === 
 
     Table 4 shows the distribution of preferential margin, i.e., the difference between 
MFN rates and preferential rates, in 2011 by ASEAN+1 FTAs. The data on MFN rates 
and preferential rates in 2011 are obtained from the database of World Integrated Trade 
Solution (WITS).
3
 In AANZFTA, AIFTA, and AJCEP, most of the preferential products 
have small margins like the margin of (0%, 5%]. Particularly in the cases of AANZFTA 
and AIFTA, 98% and 91% of eligible products have a margin of (0%, 5%], respectively. 
Such a share is 56% in the case of AJCEP, but the share of eligible products with a 
margin of (5%, 10%] is also relatively high, at 38%. In the case of ACFTA, relatively 
high shares can be seen in the eligible products with margins of (5%, 10%] and (10%, 
50%]. AKFTA has the highest share of products with a margin of (5%, 10%]. In sum, 
we may say that ACFTA and AKFTA have relatively large tariff margins. 
 
===   Table 4   === 
 
Table 5 shows FTA utilization rates in Thai exports to Australia, China, India, 
Japan, and Korea under ASEAN+1 FTA schemes. “Total”, “In Eligible”, and “Under 
FTA” mean total exports, exports of eligible products under all tariff schemes, and 
exports of eligible products under FTA schemes, respectively. Columns (IV) and (V) 
report “Total” divided by “In Eligible” and “Under FTA”, respectively. The rates in 
column (V) are usually called “FTA utilization rates”. The data on total exports and 
exports for eligible products are obtained from World Trade Atlas as imports of the 
partner countries. The data on exports under FTA schemes are from the Bureau of Trade 
Preference Development, Department of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce, 
Kingdom of Thailand. Put differently, our FTA utilization data are based on the CoOs 
rather than customs.
4
 
                                                   
3
 http://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/ 
4
 Thus, in our measure of utilization rates, the numerator and denominator are FOB basis and CIF 
basis, respectively. This inconsistency may yield some biases in the measurement. It is easily 
possible to compute the denominator also by employing FOB basis data, i.e., Thai data on exports. 
Then, since the tariff-line classification in each partner country is different from that in Thailand, we 
7 
 
 
===   Table 5   === 
 
There are some noteworthy points in Table 5. Thailand has both bilateral and 
multilateral FTAs with Australia, India, and Japan, so that FTA utilization rates are 
rather low in the cases of AANZFTA (1%), AIFTA (23%), and AJCEP (1%). In other 
words, firms in Thailand tend to use bilateral FTA schemes in exporting to these 
countries maybe due to those earlier years of entry into force and thus the larger tariff 
margin. The relatively high rates in AIFTA among these three FTAs are because only the 
early-harvest program has entered into force in the Thailand-India FTA. ASEAN-China 
and ASEAN-Korea FTAs have relatively high utilization rates, which are respectively 
54% and 48%. However, exports under the ACFTA and AKFTA schemes occupy only 
21% and 17% of total exports to China and Korea, respectively. 
 
 
3. Empirical Framework 
     This section specifies our empirical framework for examining the impacts of 
common RoOs on FTA utilization. In the empirical analysis, we focus on Thai exports 
to China and Korea. Thailand is a member of not only ACFTA and AKFTA but also 
AANZFTA, AIFTA, and AJCEP. However, it has both bilateral and multilateral FTA 
schemes with Australia, India, Japan, and New Zealand. In this case, firms’ decisions on 
FTA use will be qualitatively different; firms will choose their tariff scheme from 
among MFN rates, bilateral FTA rates, and multilateral FTA rates rather than simply 
from between MFN rates and FTA rates. Since our aim is not to examine such 
complicated decisions on tariff schemes, we simply focus on trading pairs in which only 
a single FTA scheme is available, i.e., China and Korea. 
     Our analysis is conducted for Thai exports in 2011 at the HS six-digit level. The 
usual specifications in the previous studies, which are listed in the introductory section, 
are as follow. 
Utilizationic = α Marginic +γ ln Monthly Exportsic + Dic β + uc + εic, 
                                                                                                                                                     
are forced to use Thai data on exports at the HS six-digit level. However, since preferential eligibility 
is defined at the tariff-line level in partner countries, the use of HS six-digit level data in Thailand 
implies the inclusion of trade values for not only eligible products but also ineligible products, 
leading to biases in the denominator. In short, the use of Thai data and partners’ data results in 
containing CIF/FOB differences and trade values for ineligible products, respectively. Our decision 
on the use of partners’ data in computing the denominator of FTA utilization rates was made because 
we believe that the biases from the inclusion of trade values for ineligible products are much more 
serious than those from CIF/FOB differences. 
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where Utilizationic is FTA utilization rates in exporting product i to country c. Marginic 
denotes preference margin in exporting product i to country c. We aggregate tariffs at 
the tariff-line level up to those at the HS six-digit level by taking the simple average. 
Monthly Exportsic is the average of monthly exports of product i to country c in 2011. 
This variable controls for the role of firm-level transaction sizes in FTA utilization.
5
 
Most of the previous studies (e.g., Hakobyan, 2012) use the product-country-level 
annual trade values. Obviously, such values are too large as a proxy for firm-level 
transaction sizes. Therefore, Keck and Lendle (2012) employ the product-customs 
district-level monthly trade data and call these data “pseudo-transaction-level” trade 
values. Due to data availability, this paper uses the product-country-level monthly trade 
values, which meet a medium level of accuracy as a proxy for firm-level transaction 
sizes between product-country-level annual trade values and pseudo-transaction-level 
trade values. Dic is a vector of dummy variables indicating RoOs in exporting product i 
to country c. We employ the rough RoOs, i.e., CTC rather than CC, CH, or CS. An 
importer dummy variable (uc), i.e., an FTA scheme dummy, is also included. 
     In order to examine the impacts of common RoOs, we extend the above equation. 
Specifically, we introduce a vector of dummy variables, Common (X)ic, as shown in the 
following. 
 
Utilizationic = α Marginic +γ ln Monthly Exportsic + Common (X)ic δ+ Dic β + uc + εic, 
 
where X = {CTC, CTC&RVC, CTC/RVC, RVC, WO}. Let x be an element of X and 
show a type of RoOs. Then, Common (x)ic takes the value one if RoOs in exporting 
product i to country c are x and any other ASEAN+1 FTAs also adopt x for that product. 
δ is a vector of coefficients to be estimated. For example, the positively significant 
coefficient for Common (x) implies that the harmonization of RoOs to a type x raises 
FTA utilization rates. We estimate this model by employing a fractional logit estimation 
technique proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) because our dependent variable 
lies in the unit interval, i.e., [0, 1].
6
 The data sources are the same as in the previous 
section. 
                                                   
5
 As theoretically demonstrated in Demidova and Krishna (2008), even if the tariff margin is trivial, 
the more productive firms are more likely to use FTA schemes in exporting because such firms have 
larger outputs and thus obtain larger tariff savings through the use of FTA schemes. 
6
 The fractional logit model ensures that, unlike the ordinary least square method (OLS), the 
predicted values of the dependent variable are in the unit interval. Also, unlike the log-odds ratio 
model and the beta regression model, it can naturally define dependent variables for the boundary 
values 0 and 1. It imposes less restrictive assumptions than the Tobit model (requiring the normality 
and homoskedasticity of the dependent variables). For more details, see Ramalho et al. (2011). 
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     Before reporting our estimation results, several empirical issues are to be noted. 
First, due to the use of CoOs data, we are forced to aggregate the tariff margin in arbitral 
ways. While the customs data report preferential imports at a tariff line-level, the CoOs 
data on preferential exports are usually available at the HS six-digit level. Thus, in the 
case of using CoOs data, we need to aggregate the tariff-line level tariff margin to the 
HS six-digit level tariff margin. As mentioned above, we take the simple average, but in 
our robustness checks, we try some other ways of aggregation. Second, we should take 
into account the availability of zero MFN rates in other ASEAN+1 FTAs. Speaking in 
the extreme, if members of all of the other ASEAN+1 FTAs provide zero MFN rates, 
while the RoOs commonality dummy becomes automatically zero, firms are free to 
adjust their inputs to comply with the concerned ASEAN+1 FTA. Our robustness check 
takes care of such a case to some extent. Third, as pointed out in Hakobyan (2012), the 
coefficient for Monthly Exports might suffer from endogeneity biases because 
unobserved shocks may have influence on both average monthly exports and the 
dependent variable (particularly its denominator). Thus, we use the instrumental 
variable (IV) method in our robustness checks. Last, our estimates may suffer from 
sample selection biases because we restrict our sample only to observations with any 
exports due to the nature of the denominator of our dependent variable. Thus, we use 
the Heckman model in our robustness checks.
7
 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
     This section reports our estimation results. The baseline results are provided in 
column (I) in Table 6. To save space, we do not report the estimation results in RoOs 
dummy variables (available upon request). First, unlike the previous studies, the 
coefficient for the tariff margin is insignificantly estimated. Second, Monthly Exports is 
significantly positive, as is consistent with our expectation. Namely, the higher FTA 
utilization rates are observed in the exports with the larger monthly trade values. Third, 
the results in RoOs commonality dummy variables are as follow. We can see negatively 
significant impacts of sharing “CTC”, “CTC&RVC”, or “WO”. The commonality in 
“CTC/RVC” and “RVC” has insignificant impacts. These results imply that the 
harmonization to CTC/RVC plays to some extent a good role in terms of not 
                                                   
7
 Our aim here is different from Manchin (2006), which employs the Heckman estimation technique 
in order to include zero utilization rates into an estimation sample. Namely, while ours is to tackle 
zero issues for the denominator of utilization rates, Manchin (2006) uses the Heckman to tackle zero 
issues for the numerator of utilization rates. Also, we naturally include zero utilization rates because 
we do not take a log of utilization rates as in the previous studies except for Manchin (2006). 
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discouraging firms’ use of FTA schemes. On the other hand, the harmonization to CTC, 
CTC&RVC, or WO hinders firms from using those schemes. 
 
===   Table 6   === 
 
     Next, we conduct several robustness checks on our above baseline results. First, 
we explore the reasons for the insignificant coefficient for Margin. To do that, we 
change the method of aggregation. Columns (II) and (III) take minimum rates and 
maximum rates among tariff rates at the tariff-line level within the same HS six-digit 
code, respectively. However, the results are qualitatively unchanged. In particular, the 
coefficients for Margin are still insignificant. Column (IV) introduces a dummy taking 
the value one for tariff margins above 17% and zero otherwise. “17%” is obtained from 
the estimation of the Threshold Regression model (see Francois et al., 2006). While the 
results in other variables are unchanged, the new dummy has a significantly positive 
coefficient. The latter result implies that the costs for the use of FTA schemes in 
exporting from Thailand are 17% on a tariff-equivalent basis. This estimate is rather 
high compared with the estimates in the previous studies. For example, Francois et al. 
(2006) found in Cotonou preferences that such costs range between 4% and 4.5%. 
     Second, we include dummy variables of strict RoOs (e.g., CC, CH, or CS) rather 
than those of rough RoOs (i.e., CTC). However, for simplicity and avoiding many 
combinations of RoOs commonality, we restrict the use of RoOs commonality dummy 
variables to those constructed based on rough RoOs. Also, we use the variable of tariff 
margin based on the simple average. The results are reported in column (V) and are 
totally unchanged. In particular, sharing “CTC”, “CTC&RVC”, or “WO” has negative 
impacts on FTA utilization but sharing “CTC/RVC” or “RVC” does not. 
     Third, we take care of the availability of zero MFN rates in other ASEAN+1 
FTAs. If firms can use zero MFN rates in exporting to members of other ASEAN+1 
FTAs, they are relatively free to adjust their inputs in trying to export to a concerned 
country under FTA schemes. In order to control for this case, we introduce the variable 
Freeic, which is the number of plus-one countries (excluding country c) that have zero 
MFN rates for product i. The results are reported in column (VI). The new variable has 
a significantly negative coefficient. This is a puzzling result, but it may indicate that 
since firms also can enjoy zero tariff rates in exporting to other countries, they may not 
want to change their optimal procurement sources in order to keep their international 
competitiveness. The results for other variables are unchanged. 
     Fourth, we account for endogenity in our variable of Monthly Exports by 
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employing the IV method. Following Hakobyan (2012), we use the average of monthly 
exports of product i to the rest of the world (Exports to the ROW) as an instrument 
variable. The results are reported in Table 7. In the first stage regression, the coefficients 
for Exports to the ROW are estimated to be significantly positive. The results in the 
second stage regression are basically unchanged. The noteworthy differences are that 
the coefficient for Margin is significant in the case of maximum rates and that the 
coefficients for Common (WO) are insignificant. 
 
===   Table 7   === 
 
     Last, we account for the possible sample selection biases. The source for such 
biases is that Utilization is definable only in the case of positive exports. Using the 
average of monthly exports of product i to the rest of the world, i.e., Exports to the 
ROW, as an excluded variable, we estimate the Heckman sample selection model, of 
which estimation results are reported in Table 8. In the selection equation, the 
coefficients for Exports to the ROW are estimated to be significantly positive. The 
coefficients for the inverse of Mills ratio are also estimated to be significant, indicating 
the necessity of controlling for the sample selection mechanism. The results in the 
outcome equation are basically unchanged and are qualitatively similar to those in 
Table 7, except for Margin(Max).
8
 
 
===   Table 8   === 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
     This paper examines empirically the impacts of commonality of RoOs with other 
ASEAN+1 FTAs on AKFTA/ACFTA utilization in Thai exports in 2011. Specifically, 
we explore whether or not the ACFTA/AKFTA utilization is higher when 
ACFTA/AKFTA shares RoOs with some other ASEAN+1 FTAs including AANZFTA, 
                                                   
8
 We also conduct some more robustness checks. First, in some cases, different de jure criteria might 
have the same de facto meaning. For example, the RoO criteria for fish are RVC under ACFTA, CC 
under AJCEP, and WO under both AANZFTA and AKFTA. Although these de jure criteria are 
different, the real practice is merely that the fish eligible for the preferences are to be raised or 
caught in the country since no one can turn other animals into fish. However, it is technically 
difficult to take into account this issue for all products. Thus, as one robustness check, we simply 
drop unprocessed agricultural products, namely products categorized in HS Sections 1 and 2, and 
obtain similar results. Second, as shown in Table 1, the variation of RoOs is small in the case of 
ACFTA. We dropped the sample of exporting to China but got qualitatively similar results. One 
noteworthy difference is that Common (RVC) has significantly positive coefficients. 
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AIFTA, and AJCEP. Our careful empirical analysis reveals that sharing “CTC” or 
“CTC&RVC” with other ASEAN+1 FTAs lowers the utilization of ACFTA/AKFTA. On 
the other hand, we found that sharing “RVC” or “CTC/RVC” with other FTAs does not 
discourage firms from using FTA schemes. These results suggest that the harmonization 
of RoOs across FTAs into “RVC” or “CTC/RVC” play some role in reducing the costs 
yielded through the spaghetti bowl phenomenon. On the other hand, harmonization to 
CTC, CTC&RVC, or WO hinders firms from using those schemes. 
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Table 1. RoOs by ASEAN+1 FTA 
AANZFTA ACFTA AIFTA AJCEP AKFTA
CC 122 1 508 2
CC&RVC 2
CC&TECH 27 363         
CC/(RVC&TECH) 65         
CC/RVC 308 7 15 446
CC/RVC/TECH 14         
CC/TECH 12 43         
CH 111 81 1
CH&RVC 4
CH&TECH 84         
CH/(CS&RVC)/RVC 96         
CH/(RVC&TECH) 6         
CH/RVC 1,292 114 958 3,074
CH/RVC/TECH 21
CH/TECH 78 180         
CS 2         
CS&RVC 4,191         
CS/RVC 345 8 61
RVC 49 3,959 25 53
RVC/TECH 392         
TECH/WO 6         
WO 28 8 1 298
FREE 2,320 322 137 2,578 729
NO 173 249 724 206 361
Total 5,052 5,052 5,052 5,052 5,052  
Source: Authors’ classification based on legal texts pertaining to each FTA. 
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Table 2. RoOs Matrix Showing ACFTA and Other ASEAN+1 FTAs 
CTC CTC/RVC RVC RVC/TECH WO FREE NO
AANZFTA
CTC 145 86          2
CTC&TECH 27          
CTC/(RVC&TECH) 6 65          
CTC/RVC 1 87 1,646 65          86 156
CTC/RVC/TECH 7 2 1 4
CTC/TECH 90          
RVC 36          13
TECH/WO 6          
WO 27          1
FREE 26 1,965 17 7 232 73
NO 2 37 130          3 1
AIFTA
CTC&RVC 1 99 3,363 331 7 202 188
FREE 9 41          81 6
NO 13 555 61 1 39 55
AJCEP
CTC 53 483 1 10 44
CTC&TECH 136 310          1
CTC/RVC 47 913          12 9
CTC/TECH 146 76          1
RVC 25          
WO 1          
FREE 12 2,083 5 7 299 172
NO 1 9 173          1 22
AKFTA
CTC 1          2
CTC&RVC 6          
CTC/RVC 1 108 2,939 358          104 71
CTC/RVC/TECH 21          
RVC 3 36 1 1 12
WO 281 1 1 6 9
FREE 9 400 6 192 122
NO 276 33          19 33
ACFTA
 
Source: Authors’ classification based on legal texts on each FTA 
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Table 3. RoOs Matrix Showing AKFTA and Other ASEAN+1 FTAs 
CTC CTC&RVC CTC/RVC CTC/RVC/TECH RVC WO FREE NO
AANZFTA
CTC 194 11 1 27
CTC&TECH 27              
CTC/(RVC&TECH) 1 68              2
CTC/RVC 3 1521 10 11 382 114
CTC/RVC/TECH 2 9 1              2
CTC/TECH 88 2              
RVC 28 18              2 1
TECH/WO 6
WO 14 6 1 7
FREE 2 1 1480 8 22 274 336 197
NO 152 2              8 11
AIFTA
CTC&RVC 1 5 3,264 21 22 201 460 217
FREE 44 4 82 7
NO 2 1 273 31 93 187 137
AJCEP
CTC 1 2 285 17 161 1 124
CTC&TECH 411 3              33
CTC/RVC 922              16 43
CTC/TECH 203 18              2
RVC 21 4              
WO 1
FREE 1 3 1678 30 96 711 59
NO 1 1 61 2 40 1 100
AKFTA
 
Source: Authors’ classification based on legal texts on each FTA 
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Table 4. Distribution of Preferential Margin by ASEAN+1 FTA 
Total
Number Share Number Share Number Share Number Share
AANZFTA 2,921 98% 67 2% 0 0% 0 0% 2,988
ACFTA 1,342 20% 3,186 47% 2,199 33% 3 0.04% 6,730
AIFTA 9,023 91% 885 9% 12 0% 12 0.1% 9,932
AJCEP 2,260 56% 1,518 38% 226 6% 0 0% 4,004
AKFTA 1,157 13% 6,987 76% 1,044 11% 10 0.1% 9,198
0% < Margin ≤ 5% 5% < Margin ≤ 10% 10% < Margin ≤ 50% Margin > 50%
 
Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) 
Notes: In this table, we classify each product at the tariff-line level. Naturally, this table does not include products with zero MFN rates and those not 
eligible for FTA schemes. 
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Table 5. FTA Utilization Rates by ASEAN+1 FTA 
Total In Eligible Under FTA
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
= (III)/(I) = (III)/(II)
AANZFTA 10,539 6,622 77 1% 1%
ACFTA 39,040 15,044 8,135 21% 54%
AIFTA 5,068 4,116 957 19% 23%
AJCEP 24,522 5,866 40 0.2% 1%
AKFTA 5,353 1,891 903 17% 48%  
Sources: Regarding total exports and exports for eligible products, we use the data on partners’ 
imports, which are obtained from World Trade Atlas. The data on exports under FTA schemes are 
from the Bureau of Trade Preference Development, Department of Foreign Trade, Ministry of 
Commerce, Kingdom of Thailand. 
Note: “Total”, “In Eligible”, and “Under FTA” indicate total exports, exports of eligible products 
under all tariff schemes, and exports under FTA schemes, respectively. 
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Table 6. Fractional Logit Model 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Margin (Mean) 0.026 0.027 0.021
[0.024] [0.025] [0.024]
Margin (Min) 0.024
[0.025]
Margin (Max) 0.024
[0.019]
Margin (Threshold) 0.836***
[0.124]
Monthly Exports 0.255*** 0.255*** 0.254*** 0.256*** 0.255*** 0.255***
[0.017] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.017]
Common (CTC) -6.043*** -6.033*** -6.014*** -5.804*** -6.054*** -6.209***
[1.382] [1.382] [1.370] [1.409] [1.387] [1.390]
Common (CTC&RVC) -5.162*** -5.156*** -5.136*** -5.172*** -5.588*** -5.169***
[1.543] [1.541] [1.535] [1.609] [1.534] [1.551]
Common (CTC/RVC) 0.187 0.183 0.184 0.152 0.16 0.125
[0.123] [0.123] [0.122] [0.120] [0.143] [0.126]
Common (RVC) 0.314 0.341 0.279 0.268 0.311 0.257
[0.244] [0.239] [0.251] [0.230] [0.245] [0.242]
Common (WO) -12.208*** -12.236*** -12.198*** -12.318*** -12.704*** -12.155***
[0.763] [0.764] [0.763] [0.766] [0.763] [0.784]
Free -0.213***
[0.057]
RoOs Dummy Rough Rough Rough Rough Strict Rough
Observations 3,965 3,965 3,965 3,965 3,965 3,965
Log pseudolikelihood -1584 -1584 -1583 -1574 -1583 -1577  
Notes: The parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance, respectively. We include the FTA scheme dummy variable, i.e., ACFTA or AKFTA. We 
include RoOs dummy variables, the results of which are not reported here. Rough RoOs indicate 
those types shown in Tables 2 and 3. Strict RoOs indicate those types shown in Table 1. 
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Table 7. IV Estimation 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
2nd-stage Regression
Margin (Mean) 0.004 0.004 0.003
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Margin (Min) 0.003
[0.002]
Margin (Max) 0.003*
[0.002]
Margin (Threshold) 0.153***
[0.024]
Monthly Exports 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.078***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Common (CTC) -1.031*** -1.033*** -1.027*** -0.956*** -1.031*** -1.037***
[0.255] [0.256] [0.253] [0.287] [0.256] [0.256]
Common (CTC&RVC) -0.837*** -0.839*** -0.834*** -0.801** -0.929*** -0.835***
[0.285] [0.286] [0.283] [0.321] [0.283] [0.286]
Common (CTC/RVC) -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.016 -0.034 -0.015
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.024] [0.020]
Common (RVC) 0.046 0.049 0.042 0.035 0.045 0.043
[0.043] [0.043] [0.044] [0.042] [0.043] [0.043]
Common (WO) -0.151 -0.154 -0.151 -0.166 -0.147 -0.148
[0.181] [0.182] [0.181] [0.190] [0.182] [0.183]
Free -0.011
[0.008]
1st-stage Regression
Exports to the ROW 0.482*** 0.481*** 0.483*** 0.481*** 0.483*** 0.482***
[0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024]
RoOs Dummy Rough Rough Rough Rough Strict Rough
Observations 3,965 3,965 3,965 3,965 3,965 3,965
1st-stage R-squared 0.2479 0.2479 0.2478 0.2480 0.2510 0.2512  
Notes: The parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance, respectively. We include the FTA scheme dummy variable, i.e., ACFTA or AKFTA. We 
report the coefficients for only instruments, i.e., Exports to the ROW, in the case of the first-stage 
regression. We include RoOs dummy variables, the results of which are not reported here. Rough 
RoOs indicate those types shown in Tables 2 and 3. Strict RoOs indicates those types shown in Table 
1. 
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Table 8. Heckman Estimation 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Outcome Equation
Margin (Mean) 0.002 0.002 0.002
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Margin (Min) 0.002
[0.002]
Margin (Max) 0.002
[0.002]
Margin (Threshold) 0.120***
[0.021]
Monthly Exports 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.025***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Common (CTC) -0.713*** -0.713*** -0.712*** -0.657*** -0.713*** -0.727***
[0.098] [0.098] [0.097] [0.125] [0.098] [0.101]
Common (CTC&RVC) -0.522*** -0.522*** -0.521*** -0.497** -0.622*** -0.517***
[0.191] [0.191] [0.191] [0.217] [0.200] [0.192]
Common (CTC/RVC) 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.002 0.000
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.018] [0.016]
Common (RVC) 0.027 0.028 0.023 0.016 0.026 0.019
[0.040] [0.040] [0.040] [0.039] [0.040] [0.040]
Common (WO) -0.155 -0.158 -0.153 -0.16 -0.153 -0.147
[0.112] [0.112] [0.112] [0.112] [0.112] [0.117]
Free -0.025***
[0.007]
Selection Equation
Exports to the ROW 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.206***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Lambda -0.143*** -0.143*** -0.143*** -0.142*** -0.143*** -0.142***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
RoOs Dummy Rough Rough Rough Rough Strict Rough
Observations 8,440 8,440 8,440 8,440 8,440 8,440
Chi2 for Wald test (Rho = 0) 343 345 341 341 341 341
Log pseudolikelihood -5638 -5639 -5638 -5623 -5637 -5632  
Notes: The parentheses are robust standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance, respectively. We include the FTA scheme dummy variable, i.e., ACFTA or AKFTA. We 
report the coefficients for only excluded variables, i.e., Exports to the ROW, in the case of the 
selection equation. We include RoOs dummy variables, the results of which are not reported here. 
Rough RoOs indicate those types shown in Tables 2 and 3. Strict RoOs indicates those types shown 
in Table 1. 
